The trials of Atef Najib, the former head of the Political Security Branch in Daraa, and Ahmad Badreddin Hassoun, the former Grand Mufti of the Syrian Arab Republic, represent one of the most significant milestones in Syria’s transitional justice process. Their importance stems not only from the defendants’ positions or political symbolism, but also from the profound legal questions they raise about the nature of criminal responsibility, the scope of domestic law, and the relationship between the Syrian judiciary and international law.
These trials should not be treated merely as a response to legitimate public anger accumulated over many years. They are also a test of the new Syrian state’s ability to move from revenge to justice, and from broad political condemnation to the proof of individual responsibility before an independent court.
Atef Najib: Responsibility for Orders and Direct Violations
Atef Najib’s trial began before the Fourth Criminal Court in Damascus on 26 April 2026, on charges connected to the suppression of peaceful protests in Daraa in 2011. During subsequent hearings, the court heard testimony concerning killings, torture, arbitrary detention, denial of medical assistance to the injured, and other violations allegedly committed by security agencies.
Under Syrian law, Najib’s potential responsibility may be examined through provisions of the Penal Code concerning homicide, bodily harm, incitement, complicity, and the issuing of orders, as well as Anti-Torture Law No. 16 of 2022. However, applying a law enacted in 2022 to earlier conduct requires careful consideration of the principle of non-retroactivity in criminal law. A later law must not be applied retroactively when it is more severe for the accused.
At the international level, his responsibility may fall within the framework of crimes against humanity if the alleged acts are proven to have formed part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, and if the accused knew of that context and contributed to it.
Depending on the evidence, responsibility may also be examined for ordering, inciting, or assisting the commission of crimes. “Command responsibility” under international law, however, does not arise from rank alone. It requires proof that the commander exercised effective control over subordinates, knew or had information that should have led him to know about the crimes, and failed to prevent or punish them.
A temporal distinction must also be made between the repression of peaceful demonstrators in early 2011, before the armed conflict had fully developed, and crimes committed later in connection with the conflict. The earlier acts may constitute crimes against humanity or serious domestic offences, but they do not automatically qualify as war crimes unless a sufficient nexus to an existing armed conflict is established.
Ahmad Badreddin Hassoun: When Does Speech Give Rise to Criminal Responsibility?
Ahmad Badreddin Hassoun’s trial began on 25 June 2026. According to information presented during the proceedings, the case concerns allegations of incitement to violence, justification of killings, and the provision of religious and political cover for acts committed by the former regime. The court has heard witnesses and received digital material from the prosecution, while the defence requested a technical examination of video recordings to verify their authenticity and ensure they had not been manipulated.
Legally, Hassoun’s case is more complex than that of a security official accused of issuing direct orders. A political position or morally reprehensible speech is not, by itself, sufficient to establish criminal responsibility for murder or torture.
Under international criminal law, direct and public incitement is criminalised as a separate offence in relation to genocide. For war crimes and crimes against humanity, it is generally necessary to prove that the speech amounted to an order, effective instigation, or assistance in the commission of specific crimes, or that it contributed to the crime of persecution as part of a widespread or systematic attack.
The court must therefore determine with precision:
- The content and timing of each statement attributed to the accused.
- The audience to which it was directed, particularly if it included members of the military or security services.
- The specific crimes to which the speech allegedly contributed.
- The connection between the speech and the conduct of the perpetrators.
- The accused’s knowledge of the criminal context and his intent.
- The influence arising from his religious and official position, without treating that position as sufficient evidence in itself.
Submitting the video material to technical examination is an important safeguard, not an obstacle to accountability. A durable judgment must rest on authentic and reliable evidence and on a legal analysis of the link between words and crimes, rather than on the popularity or media circulation of particular recordings.
The Domestic Framework and the Legislative Gap
The trials draw on a combination of the Syrian Penal Code, the Anti-Torture Law, other legislation, and the transitional Constitutional Declaration. Article 12 of the Declaration recognises the rights and freedoms contained in international human rights treaties ratified by Syria as part of the constitutional framework.
Syrian law, however, still lacks comprehensive definitions of crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, enforced disappearance, and command responsibility in forms consistent with international law. Syria is also not a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
This creates a challenge under the principle of “no crime or punishment without law” and the prohibition of retroactive criminal legislation. The problem may be addressed in part through Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which does not prevent the trial of conduct that was criminal at the time of its commission according to the general principles of law recognised by the community of nations.
That approach nevertheless requires exceptionally precise judicial reasoning. It is not enough to label conduct a “crime against humanity” without identifying the elements of the crime, the legal basis applicable when it occurred, and the mode of responsibility attributed to each accused.
There is therefore an urgent need for comprehensive transitional justice legislation that defines crimes and modes of liability, establishes rules of evidence and witness protection, and safeguards victims’ rights—without creating retroactive or exceptional criminal laws directed at individuals because of their political affiliation.
Fair-Trial Guarantees Are Not a Privilege for the Accused
Respect for the presumption of innocence, the right to defence, public hearings, the examination of witnesses and evidence, access to legal counsel, and the right to appeal does not conflict with victims’ rights. These safeguards give judgments legitimacy and prevent trials from becoming acts of revenge that can be challenged domestically and internationally.
The language used outside the courtroom also matters. Najib and Hassoun should legally be described as “the accused” until final judgments are issued. The presumption of innocence does not deny the suffering of victims or diminish the seriousness of the allegations.
Justice must also encompass all victims and all serious violations, irrespective of the identity or affiliation of the perpetrator. Selective justice may produce judgments, but it cannot build public trust or a sustainable national reconciliation.
Transitional Justice Is Broader Than Punishment
Criminal trials are an essential pillar of transitional justice, but they are not the whole process. A comprehensive approach also requires:
- Truth-seeking and documentation of patterns of violations.
- Clarifying the fate of missing and forcibly disappeared persons.
- Reparations, compensation, and rehabilitation for victims.
- Reform of the security and judicial institutions.
- Preservation of national memory.
- Guarantees of non-recurrence.
- The participation of victims, women, and civil society in policymaking.
Cooperation with the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria, as well as with national authorities exercising universal jurisdiction, can assist in preserving evidence, building professional case files, and prosecuting suspects located abroad. The International Criminal Court does not automatically have jurisdiction over crimes committed in Syria because Syria is not a party to the Rome Statute, unless Syria accepts the Court’s jurisdiction or the United Nations Security Council refers the situation to it.
Conclusion
The trials of Atef Najib and Ahmad Badreddin Hassoun could help establish a new chapter for Syria, provided that justice is measured not by the speed or severity of judgments, but by the quality of evidence, the precision of legal characterisation, judicial independence, and respect for the rights of both the defence and the victims.
What is required is not a series of symbolic trials designed to close the files of the past, but a judiciary capable of documenting the truth, establishing individual responsibility, and issuing judgments that can withstand appeal and international legal scrutiny.
Genuine transitional justice does not replace one injustice with another and does not convict people solely because of their positions or speeches. It makes law—not revenge—the basis of accountability, and places victims’ dignity and the rule of law at the starting point for building a Syria in which such crimes are not repeated.
Legal note: The cases remain pending before the courts. All allegations are subject to proof, and both accused persons are presumed innocent until final judgments are issued.
